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The Role of Social Influence in Enforcing Tax Compliance: Experimental 
Evidence from Nigeria 
 





Economic development is linked with increased state capacity including the ability to mobilise 
domestic tax resources. For many developing countries, high levels of informality are a major 
constraint in this regard. Yet, economic incentives like changing the tax rate or increasing the 
filling and audit rate can be ineffective in a highly informal economic structure. In this paper, 
we explore possible roles for behavioural interventions such as sharing information about 
peers’ tax behaviour to engineer higher tax compliance. Based on an artefactual field 
experiment among own account workers in Nigeria, we find that information interventions can 
play an important role in ensuring tax compliance. Specifically, targeting information around 
what people can directly observe can be a way to improve tax compliance. Providing 
information on punishment or good practices that appeal to feelings of morality yields higher 
tax compliance.  
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Improving tax compliance is one of the most pressing policy challenges facing African 
countries (Sy and Sow 2016). With the tripartite problems of high informality, weak state 
capacity for efficient tax collection, and low financial inclusion, tax systems rely more on self-
assessment and voluntary compliance (Okello 2014). This has resulted in huge tax gaps for 
many countries and shallow fiscal space for active economic management. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF 2018) estimated that sub-Saharan African countries have an annual tax 
gap of $50–80 billion, which exceeded the total overseas development assistance to the 
continent in 2018.  
 
Recent literature has emphasised the use of non-pecuniary mechanisms (behavioural 
factors) as alternative tools to improve compliance including through the social influence of 
peers (Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe and Vlaev 2017; Alm, Bloomquist and McKee 2015), 
appealing to patriotism (Moore 2004) and signalling improved political accountability and 
service delivery (Tyler 2006; Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl 2008).   
 
In this paper, we examine the role of social influence on compliance when individuals are 
exposed to information on the tax behaviour of their peers. For example, showing tax 
defaulters information about the percentage of people already paying tax has been found to 
improve compliance (Hallsworth et al. 2017). However, the literature also demonstrates that 
it is the information content that matters for compliance, as different information types, either 
full or partial information, could yield disparate outcomes (Alm et al. 2015).  
 
In this paper, we test the basic predictions of the social influence theory in an artefactual field 
experiment among own account workers in Nigeria. Own account workers are those 
identified either as self-employed or who do not engage any other employees on a 
continuous basis. It is estimated that over 99 per cent of firms in Nigeria are micro 
enterprises or own account workers and they largely operate in the informal sector (Nigerian 
Bureau of Statistics and the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency 2019). This 
informal economic structure partly explains the low tax compliance in Nigeria, as 73 per cent 
of the labour force are not within the tax net (Adeyemi and Adeduro 2020). In this context, 
governments mostly resort to non-pecuniary mechanisms to mobilise resources from the 
informal sector. 
 
We set up a laboratory experiment that allows for differentiation of the information content 
about peers that individuals can observe. In one setting, the participants were shown all tax-
related information about their peers, including how many were filing their taxes, the reported 
income, amount of tax paid, number of people audited, and amount of penalty paid by 
defaulters. In the second setting, the only information shown was the amount of tax paid by 
the highest taxpayers in their group. In the third setting, only information about those 
penalised for tax evasion was shown. The three treatments were compared with the control 
group in which no information was shown. We found that the compliance level when the full 
information is revealed was worse than the outcome when no information was shown. 
However, in scenarios when only partial information was shown (second and third settings), 
the tax compliance improved significantly relative to the full information treatment and in the 
control group.  
 
This paper contributes to existing literature on the subject in three ways. First, this study is 
novel with regard to the choice of experimental approach applied to Nigeria. Existing studies 
on tax compliance in Nigeria have adopted a case study approach or use observational data 
(Modugu and Anyaduba 2014; de Gramont 2015). However, phenomena like social influence 
are difficult to isolate in observational data given many confounding variables and the 
presence of other behavioural attributes. Experimental data is crucial to sidestep these 
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concerns as it allows for concentration on only the variables of interest. The empirical 
evidence from this study will extend the literature in this area and expand the policy menu 
from which tax authorities can draw to achieve better compliance.  
 
Second, the paper contributes to experimental studies on the social influence theory of tax 
compliance. Notable earlier studies in this strand of the literature include Cummings, 
Martinez-Vazquez, McKee and Torgler 2009, Alm, Cherry, Jones and McKee 2010, Alm et 
al. 2015, and Luttmer and Singhal 2014. The focus of this study on the informal sector is 
distinct and separates it from the earlier literature, whose findings relate more to the entire 
economy or formal sector.  
 
Third, the study relates to literature on the effectiveness of information interventions. Studies 
on different information interventions to improve development outcomes have yielded mixed 
results (Besley and Burgess 2002; Chong, De La O, Karlan and Wantchekon 2015). Kosec 
and Wantchekon (2020) make a useful contribution to this literature by highlighting the 
conditions under which information is effective. Specifically, they propose that an information 
intervention is pro-development if it is relevant to the recipient who, in tandem, has the power 
and incentive to act on it. Our finding also reinforces these conditions regarding effectiveness 
of information with the need to focus on specific and targeted information within a reference 
group. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a brief review of tax 
compliance in Nigeria and the policy environment. Section 2 reviews the literature on social 
influence theory. Section 3 describes the theoretical model which motivates the design of our 
experiment. In section 4, we detail the experimental procedure and implementation strategy 
for the study. Section 5 presents the experimental results from both the non-parametric and 
econometric analyses. The policy implications of the results are discussed in section 6. 
 
 
1  Overview of tax compliance in Nigeria 
 
Despite its large economic size and population, Nigeria’s tax base and compliance level 
remain abysmally low. In 2018, the total tax/GDP ratio stood at 5.7 per cent (OECD 2019). 
As shown in Figure 1, Nigeria has one of the lowest tax/GDP ratios in Africa, compared to 
other low-middle income countries in Africa. Resource curse alone does not seem to explain 
Nigeria’s low compliance level as resource rich and fragile states like Congo are doing much 
better. Nigeria’s underperformance in revenue collection signals that its optimal tax capacity 
has not been reached especially with respect to the non-oil sector. Oil revenue accounts for 
49.6 per cent of general government revenue in 2019, yet the oil sector represents only 10 
per cent of the national income (Central Bank of Nigeria 2020: 16). The susceptibility of the 
economy to persistent external shocks is also evident in the nature of resource dependency 




Figure 1 Nigerian tax to GDP ratio compared to other African countries 
 
Data source: OECD (2019).  
 
Personal income tax accounts for 11 per cent of total government receipts in 2017 (Figure 2). 
While recent trends indicate progress is being made, tax performance is not at the desirable 
magnitude. Comparatively, South Africa, with less than a third of the Nigerian labour force, 
had a personal income tax of about NGN (Nigerian Naira) 9.7 trillion (US$31.7 billion) in 
2017,1 while Nigeria received NGN802 billion (US$2.6 billion) over the same period (Nigerian 
Natural Resource Charter 2019). With the recent volatility in oil price and weak global 
demand depressing prices, the government is increasingly focused on non-oil revenue 
through efforts to widen the tax base and compliance level. 
 
Figure 2 Personal income revenue in Nigeria 
 
 
Data source: OECD 2020. 
 
In the last three years, several reforms have been introduced at the national and sub-national 
levels. In 2017, the Voluntary Assets and Income Declaration Scheme (VAIDS) was initiated 
 



































to allow individuals and corporate entities to regularise their tax status for previous years or 
pay severe penalties if audited and found not to have filed accurate tax information. This 
policy hinges on the capacity of the government to identify and punish tax evaders. More 
recently, the government enacted the 2020 Finance Bill to harmonise the different tax 
policies and widen the tax net to include digital platforms with significant economic presence 
in Nigeria. The bill deployed a ‘carrot and stick’ approach with the introduction of 
mechanisms to foster compliance and simplify the tax payment system, while at the same 
time elevating the penalties for tax defaulters. 
 
The Nigerian Federal Ministry of Finance reported that the VAIDS programme raised an 
additional NGN70 billion (US$228 million)2 in revenue (Olalekan 2020), representing less 
than 1 per cent of additional revenue per annum since the inception of the policy. The trend 
in tax performance suggests the need for a better policy mix to improve tax compliance. 
Specifically, an effective combination of deterrence policy with other behavioural approaches 
could substantially improve tax performance. Evidence for this is not far-fetched, as one of 
Africa’s most impressive success stories of tax reform took place in Lagos State, Nigeria, 
between 2004 and 2011. Lagos State Government increased its revenue from less than 
NGN3 billion (US$33 million) per annum in 19993 to over NGN30 billion (US$98 million) per 
annum in 20164 without changing the tax rate (de Gramont 2015). The reform encompassed 
digitalising the tax system to reduce fraud, improving the capacity of tax administrators, and 
enhancing service delivery for taxpayers (de Gramont 2015; Goodfellow and Owen 2018).  
 
Key components of the reform, however, are the redefining of the social contract between 
government and citizens, and public enlightenment. The state government embarked on a 
massive public awareness campaign called ‘#Taxdidit’ to educate the public on the 
importance of tax and its contribution to local economic development. This was backed up by 
concrete actions through rejigging the transport and waste disposing systems and other 
tangible benefits for the citizens. According to de Gramont (2015), strategic use of 
information was crucial to improving tax compliance in Lagos State. For example, information 
on the penalty for defaulters and the benefits of paying were included as part of the 
campaign. These are examples of improving tax morale through appealing to patriotism and 
rebuilding trust through improved service delivery. This example illustrates that tax reform is 
a holistic package in which economic fundamentals and social norms play a role.    
 
The underlying economic structure in Nigeria also supports the use of behavioural 
approaches to tax compliance. The informal sector is dominant and combined with the 
absence of a strong identification system, this weakens the capacity to rely mainly on 
economic deterrence. In fact, there is limited replication of the Lagos State success story due 
to high informality among other sub-national units. In this instance, other behavioural 
interventions such as tax morale and strategic information sharing could be deployed to 
improve compliance levels. In this paper, we demonstrate the potential for this.  
 
 
2  Literature review 
 
The individual decisions to file an income return and pay tax are driven by social and 
economic factors. The standard economic theory describes this decision setting with a cost-
benefit framework where a rational economic agent weighs the benefits of under-reporting 
compared to the probability of detection and penalty for tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo 
1972). While many of the testable predictions of the standard economic models have been 
 
2 https://www.cbn.gov.ng/rates/exrate.asp?year=2020 Exchange rate US$1 = N 306.96. 
3 https://www.cbn.gov.ng/IntOps/ExchRatePolicy.asp Exchange rate US$1 = N 91.83. 
4 https://www.cbn.gov.ng/rates/exrate.asp?year=2016 Exchange rate US$1 = N 305.21. 
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confirmed empirically (Grundmann and Lambsdorff 2017; Duch and Solaz 2015), evidence 
also points to their incompleteness and the need to account for social norms and influence in 
understanding tax compliance (Fjeldstad, Snow, Miles and Lettl 2012; Guerra and Harrington 
2018; Enachescu, Olsen, Kogler, Zeelenberg, Breugelmans and Kirchler 2019).  
 
One of the key behavioural explanations of tax compliance is the social influence theory, 
which predicts that the decision to evade taxes is shaped by social norms and the degree of 
tax compliance within an individual’s reference group. When individuals think of (or observe) 
their peers paying taxes, their own commitment to pay taxes is strengthened (Hallsworth et 
al. 2017; Alm et al. 2015; Alm and Liu 2017). This can also result when the individual forms 
an expectation about the probability of detection based on the experience of their peers. The 
prevailing social norms about the importance of taxation, which are likewise derived from 
one’s immediate social group, will also influence tax behaviour (Posner 2000). 
 
An extensive body of work has emerged to test the role of information about peers in tax 
compliance behaviour. Ali, Fjeldstad and Sjursen (2014) use survey data on attitudes 
towards tax evasion in four African countries (Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and South Africa) to 
test different theories of tax compliance, including social influence theory. Their study finds 
significant evidence of social influence theory only in Tanzania, although less robust 
compared to the standard economic model. However, the social norms and influence are 
difficult to measure and test using survey data that reflects perceptions rather than 
observable decisions. Alm et al. (2015) and Alm and Liu (2017) have conducted a series of 
laboratory experiments using graduate and undergraduate students in the US as subjects to 
test this theory and conclude that receiving information on whether one’s neighbours are 
filing returns and/or reporting income has a statistically significant and economically large 
impact on individual filing and reporting decisions. However, they note that ‘neighbour’ 
information does not always improve compliance, as it depends on the content of the 
information. 
 
These findings suggest information about peers exerts a major influence on tax compliance, 
but the policy implication is opaque. Information could complicate policy space as some 
information content reduces tax compliance. For a policymaker interested in improving tax 
compliance, it is important to unpack how different information contents work and the extent 
to which information can be strategically employed as an additional tool to improve 
compliance.  
 
A few recent studies have started probing the conditions under which specific information 
content could improve tax compliance. Kettle, Hernandez, Ruda and Sanders (2016) 
conducted a national level randomised evaluation of the effect of social norms on tax 
compliance in Guatemala. The tax authority sent letters to defaulters with information 
indicating that the majority of the labour force were already paying tax and encouraging the 
defaulters to join the status quo. They found a higher payment rate among the treated group 
relative to the control group. Another large-scale test of social influence theory by the World 
Bank (2018) in Poland found that behavioural intervention, where defaulters are informed 
about the number of compliant taxpayers, induces positive responses. In addition, it was 
observed that compliance is much improved with behavioural letters using hard tones that 
highlight sanctions for noncompliance.  
 
Lefebvre, Pestieau, Riedl and Villeval (2011) conducted several laboratory experiments in 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands to delineate between different information contents. In 
the experiment where subjects were shown bad examples of low compliance, tax evasion 
tended to increase. They reported no significant effect when subjects were shown good 
examples of tax compliance. Despite these countries being in a similar development class, 
significant heterogeneity was found across countries, age group and gender, with males 




There are four key conclusions that can be drawn from the existing literature. First, while 
social influence and norms are important, they are more effective when targeted around 
descriptive norms – what other taxpayers do. Second, the context matters as effect size and 
significant level vary across countries and demographic characteristics. Third, there is a limit 
to using observational data (survey) in evaluating the effect of social norms; hence 
experimental methods (field or laboratory) have been crucial in the literature on social 
influence theory. Fourth, there is a paucity of studies on the social influence theory specific to 
sub-Saharan African countries. Yet, given that context matters, the applicability of these 
findings in African settings, and their implications, are still unknown. The trust level, value 
system and general cultural norms vary widely within the continent (Okoye 2020), which 
points to the need for evidence drawn from African experiences. In this study, we address 
some of these concerns based on an artefactual field experiment among own account 
workers in Nigeria.   
 
 
3  Theoretical framework  
 
We model the role of information about tax behaviour among peers using the extension of 
the standard economic model proposed by Alm, Bloomquist and McKee (2015). Specifically, 
Alm, Bloomquist and McKee extended the one-stage tax decision framework of Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972) to a two-stage decision framework in which the individual first decides 
whether to file an income tax return or not and if income is filed, decides how much income 
to report to the tax authority. Alm, Bloomquist and McKee incorporate information about 
peers into the model as a psychic cost the guilt that is felt by an individual who cheats on his 
or her tax liability. We build on and extend this model to account for three types of 
information content: (1) full information about peers’ tax behaviour; (2) partial information 
revealing the highest taxpayers; and (3) partial information revealing only those audited and 
the penalty paid for under-reporting.  
 
3.1 The two-stage tax decision framework 
 
In the first stage, a representative taxpayer who earns a gross income,  𝑌, decides whether to 
file an income tax return or not. Filing is the first step in tax payment as information on gross 
income and tax obligation are generated at the filing stage. We assume the detection 
probability for an individual not filing to be 𝜌 and the enforcement penalty imposed on 
detected non-filers is 𝛼 share of true income. We consider only proportional tax rate which is 
given by 𝑡. If an individual does not file and is not detected, the gross income, 𝑌, is retained. 
However, if the defaulter is caught, both the actual income and the penalty are deducted.  
 
The filing decision is therefore given by:  
 
Filing Decision = 𝐹𝐷 = (1 − 𝜌)𝑈(𝑌) + 𝜌𝑈(𝑌 − 𝑡𝑌(1 + 𝛼))                …………………... (1) 
 
where 𝑈(. ) captures the utility function of a representative taxpayer. 
 
At the second stage, those that choose to file are to decide whether to fully report or to 
under-report their income. We assume the detection probability for under-reporting to be 𝜃 
and the enforcement penalty imposed for tax avoidance to be 𝜇. It is expected 𝜃 will be 
higher than 𝜌 in a highly informal economy given the weak identification system. The penalty 
for under-reporting, 𝜇, will also differ from the penalty for not filing, 𝛼. We define the amount 




The decision to report is therefore given by:  
 
Reporting Decision = 𝑅𝐷 = (1 − 𝜃)𝑈(𝑌 − 𝑡𝐷) + 𝜃𝑈(𝑌 − 𝑡𝐷 − (1 + 𝜇)(𝑌 − 𝐷))  ………. (2) 
 
The tax decision on filing and reporting is conditional on parameters in equations (1) and (2). 
The individual will first decide whether to file a tax return or not by comparing the expected 
utility from non-filing in equation (1) with the expected utility from filing and reporting 
described by equation (2). If an individual files a tax return, he or she thereafter must choose 
the optimal amount of income to report based on equation (2). The model as so far described 
is similar to the standard economic model with only an extension to the two-stage decision 
framework.    
 
3.2 Incorporating the peer effect 
 
To account for the impact of possible information about peers on tax behaviour, Alm et al. 
(2015) introduced the concept of a psychic factor based on social norms. The psychic factor 
is a variable (𝜋 >0) measuring, in monetary terms, the feeling of guilt that is associated with 
evading one’s own tax liability if one is not caught. We depart from Alm et al.’s approach in 
characterising the psychic factor. While they conceptualise the psychic factor only as a cost 
that arises when individuals deviate from social norms of high tax compliance, as literature 
has shown, a peer effect could also generate low compliance if the majority are defaulting. 
To extend the psychic factor to a more general tax behaviour, 𝜋 is allowed to take negative 
value that is -<𝜋<. A positive 𝜋 translates to psychic costs or feelings of guilt for tax 
evasion, while a negative 𝜋 translates to a psychic benefit that an individual draws from not 
complying with the prevailing social norms.   
 
We introduce the psychic factor (𝜋) into the representative taxpayer utility function in 
equations (1) and (2). These extensions yield: 
 
Augmented Filing Decision: 𝐴𝐹𝐷 = (1 − 𝜌)𝑈(𝑌 − 𝜋) + 𝜌𝑈(𝑌 − 𝑡𝑌(1 + 𝛼)) ……………. (3) 
 
Augmented Reporting Decision:  
 
𝐴𝑅𝐷 = (1 − 𝜃)𝑈(𝑌 − 𝑡𝐷 − 𝜋) + 𝜃𝑈(𝑌 − 𝑡𝐷 − (1 + 𝜇)(𝑌 − 𝐷) …………………….. (4) 
 
The decision rule therefore still holds regarding the condition of filing a tax return and 
reporting optimal income. However, we can now draw some comparative static results about 
a peer effect and its implication for compliance attitudes. Under the condition that the utility 







= +(1 − 𝜌)𝑈′(𝑌 − 𝜋) − (1 − 𝜃)𝑈′(𝑌 − 𝑡𝐷 − 𝜋) ≷ 0  ……………………… (5) 
and the comparative static result for reporting is derived as follows:  
𝜕𝐴𝑅𝐷/𝜕𝜋 = 𝜋(1 − 𝜃)𝑈′(𝑌 − 𝑡𝐷 − 𝜋) ≷ 0  ……………………………. (6) 
 
This implies that an increase in the psychic factor could either increase or decrease the filing 
rate and amount of reported income, depending on the sign and magnitude of the psychic 
factor, all other things being equal. Information, when not targeted, can shape compliance 
levels in different directions. If everyone is exposed to information about whether their peers 
are filing, how much is paid in tax, the number of people penalised for dishonest filing in the 
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group and the penalty paid, this set of information can be interpreted differently by different 
people. While some might be focused on the penalty and therefore be induced to start filing 
and reporting their optimal income and paying their tax, others might look at the information 
about low tax paid by others and also start evading taxes. The uncertainty means the 
eventual effect of providing full information will have an ambiguous effect on tax compliance. 
This argument suggests the following proposition on the effects of full information: 
 
Proposition 1: An increase in the psychic factor 𝜋 has an ambiguous effect on the probability 
of filing a tax return and the amount of reported income.  
 
The implication of this result is that an information intervention, left on its own, cannot 
guarantee higher tax compliance. This is an observation that is well observed in the 
literature. However, when the information is specific and targeted, the dynamics could 
change. Let’s assume that potential taxpayers are only shown information about the highest 
taxpayer in their reference group and nothing else. This is an instance of revealing partial 
information to encourage compliance. In this case, individuals not filing, or under-reporting, 
will feel a sense of guilt, as the observed social norms suggest that others within the 
reference group are tax compliant. Exposing individuals to positive information about the 
most compliant taxpayer could also create competition to be the ideal taxpayers for others.  
 
This intervention ensures that the psychic factor is within a positive range (𝜋 > 0). This 
modification changes the direction of the peer effect, as an increase in psychic factor is 
expected to lead to an unambiguous increase in the amount of reported income. This 
reasoning suggests the following proposition on the effects of partial information: 
 
Proposition 2: With an intervention exposing information about the highest taxpayers, an 
increase in the psychic factor, 𝜋, will lead to an increase in the amount of reported income of 
an individual who files a return, although its effect on the probability of filing a tax return 
remains ambiguous.  
 
Another intervention that can yield a similar outcome to the one above is when only 
information about those that are punished is revealed to potential taxpayers. Again, this 
creates a sense of guilt among those that are not caught. It also acts as a threat about the 
likely punishment to be faced if caught. This will restrict the psychic factor to within positive 
range (𝜋 > 0) and lead to higher tax compliance. This analysis implies the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: With an intervention exposing information about defaulters only, an increase in 
the psychic factor, 𝜋, has an ambiguous effect on the probability of filing a tax return. 
However, this leads to an increase in the amount of reported income of an individual who 
files a return. 
 
It is equally important to ask how the effect of information and peer effect varies with 
changes in group size. The peer effect works through descriptive norms rather than 
injunctive norms (Hallsworth et al. 2017). Descriptive norms are based on what individuals 
directly observe among their peers, while injunctive norms are based on what individuals 
think others are doing. In a small group, individuals are more likely to directly observe who 
the highest taxpayer is or who was audited and incurred a stiff penalty. The descriptive 
norms are more likely to be replaced with injunctive norms as group size increases. This 
suggests that peer effect will be stronger among smaller groups than larger groups. This 
reasoning suggests this proposition on the effects of group size: 
 
Proposition 4: The tax compliance and the role of peer effect varies across group size, with 




4  Experimental design 
The study implements an experimental setting which replicates the elements of the voluntary 
reporting system of Nigeria’s individual income tax. Income is earned by performing a 
computerised task: selecting a number from zero to ten. Afterwards, participants must 
choose whether to file their tax return or not; if they choose to file, they must choose how 
much income to report, which can be between zero and the income earned. Taxes are paid 
on the income reported. However, participants are randomly audited and, in the event that 
unreported tax is discovered, the individual must pay all unreported tax plus a penalty. The 
detection probability for not filing is set at zero, which implies that those that do not file their 
tax return are not likely to be detected. This is a key feature of an informal sector with 
economic activities operating underground.  
 
Participants were informed of the features of the experimental setting (that is, the tax rate, 
audit rate, and penalty rate). The process was repeated over ten rounds as each round 
represents a single tax period. At the end of all rounds, participants are paid in cash as their 
laboratory earnings are converted to Naira. 
 
The participants were recruited through a combination of online and field visits to low-income 
areas in Abuja. The researchers set up an online google form to collect basic information on 
gender, age, and occupation type (formal or informal) from potential participants. The 
research team thereafter visited various low-income areas in Abuja (Nyanya, Mpape and 
Dutse) to recruit subjects and assist them in filling in the google form. We also announced 
the recruitment process on social media. We at no point indicated that only informal sector 
workers would be recruited. However, only those that were working in establishments not 
registered were selected. Our working definition of informal sector was firms which are not 
registered by the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) in Nigeria. Some of the participants 
worked in the formal sector, such as for the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), but were 
added to the participant pool if they engaged in other activities in the informal sector. For 
example, NYSC members that had other vocational activities not officially registered were 
included in the participant pool. The final participants selected were those that met the 
participation criteria set: working in the informal sector or being an own account worker. 
Participants were only exposed to a single treatment.   
 
As soon as participants arrived at the laboratory, they were randomly assigned to a computer 
station, and to a specific group of five individuals (including the participant) with group 
members considered as neighbours during the experiment. Each experimental session had 
at least three groups, which made it hard for anyone to know the actual members of their 
group. Groups were maintained throughout the experiment and each group was assigned a 
single treatment for the duration of the experiment. Basic instructions (see Appendix 2) were 
provided via a hardcopy and were read to participants. The first two rounds were used as 
test rounds where decisions made were non-scoring. To overcome deficiencies in using 
computers, each participant was taken through how to use the computer system provided.  
 
During the remainder of the experiment, there was no interaction between participants and 
the person running the experiment, or between each other. Participants were informed that 
all responses would be anonymous as the computers used would not be matched with the 
individual identifiers collected. Participants were also told that payments would be made 
privately at the end of the experiment. The aim was to eliminate subject-to-subject interaction 
and subject-to-experimenter interaction.  
 
The first step in the experiment involved performing an earning task that required participants 
to select a number between zero and ten. The computer also randomly picked a number 
between the same range. Matching the computer pick earned the participant 1,000 points. 
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The least a participant could earn was 500 points for selecting the figure the farthest distance 
to the computer pick. Participants could decide to file their tax or not by selecting a ‘file’ or 
‘not file’ button. In the event that the participant selected the ‘not file’ option, a new round 
began.  
 
Participants that decided to file were shown details of the experimental parameters. 
Specifically, the screen showed the tax rate, audit rate, and penalty rate. Afterwards, the 
participant had to choose the amount to report to the tax authority. For each set of entries, 
the computer automatically calculated the tax liability.  
 
The computer randomly selected which participants were to be audited. Each taxpayer was 
audited independently, and the audit was applied only to the current period’s declarations. In 
the case of under-reporting, the computer automatically deducted the taxes paid and the 
penalties due. Afterwards, the screen showed the earnings and audit outcome summary for 
the round.  
 
The features of the experimental setting included a tax rate of 20 per cent, an audit rate of 20 
per cent and a penalty rate of 40 per cent (participants had to pay unpaid taxes plus a 
penalty of 40 per cent of unpaid taxes if audited). These features were maintained 
throughout the sessions.  
 
The exact duration of the experimental session was not disclosed, and the session was 
predetermined to last for ten real rounds. A session which included instructions, two practice 
rounds, and ten real rounds took on average 50 minutes to complete. In total, 212 subjects 
participated in the experiment. Earnings averaged NGN5,412 (US$14.2) for subjects. At the 
end of the sessions, participants completed a short questionnaire in which they reported their 
age, gender and educational background. Information on prior tax knowledge was also 
obtained through the questionnaires. Specifically, the participants were asked whether they 
had paid tax before or not and about their perception of public goods, use of tax revenue and 
overall governance in Nigeria. Table 1 shows the demographic composition of the 
participants in the experiment. The majority of the participants (50 per cent) were aged 24 to 
29 years, with those aged 18 to 23, 30 to 35, and 36 to 41 accounting for 31 per cent, 13 per 
cent and 4 per cent respectively. Also, 64 per cent of the participants were male.  
 
Table 1 Demographic composition of the participants 






18–23 years 30.99 
24–29 years 50.34 
30–35 years 13.44 
36–41 years 3.78 




















4.1 Experimental treatments 
 
At the end of each round, participants are shown information about the tax behaviour of 
members of the group. There are three treatments tested in the experiment (see Table 2).  
 
(i) Partial information treatment with example of punishment (T1): all group members are 
informed of the results of the penalties (unpaid tax plus penalty) for tax evasion of 
neighbours that have been audited to illustrate the level of compliance among 
neighbours.  
(ii) Partial information treatment with example of good behaviour (T2): after all 
participants have made their filing decision, the computer informs all group members 
of the highest taxpayer in their group to indicate compliance.  
(iii) Full information treatment (T3): this displays information to group members about 
whether their peers are filing a tax return, how much is being paid in taxes, the 
number of people penalised for under-reporting and the penalty paid.  
 
To establish a baseline, we also have a control treatment in which no information on the 
other members is provided.   
 
Table 2 Experimental treatments 
Penalty information about 
neighbours 
Tax information about neighbours 
Yes No 
Yes T3 T1 
No T2 Control 
 
Each treatment including the control group is replicated at least seven times. We also add a 
treatment in which group size is reduced to three members. This is to test proposition 4 on 
the effect of group size on level of compliance. Overall, the experiment is programmed using 
the Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments (z-Tree) developed by Fischbacher 
(2007).   
 
4.2 Empirical method 
 
The experimental data derived was analysed using an econometric model that allows for the 
estimation of the treatment effects at the individual level while accounting for other 
confounding variables. Specifically: 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑊𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐺𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑋𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡   ….. (7) 
 
Where the dependent variable 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the participant’s filing or reporting decision in period t; 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the participant’s earned income in period t; 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 is profit earned, that is, income 
accumulated from the previous rounds in period t; 𝐺𝑡  is a dummy variable for group size; 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 denotes the vector of treatment variables, with T3 used as the reference group; 
𝑋𝑖 is a vector of demographic variables (such as participant’s age and sex) and other control 
variables; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term.  
 
The model is estimated for each decision taken by participants, that is, ‘filing rate’ ( 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is 1 if 
the tax form is filed, and zero otherwise), and for participants who file a form, their ‘reporting 
rate’—𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = [taxes paid/taxes owed]. The unit of analysis is the individual subject. 
Considering that there were several iterations (ten rounds), the dataset is panel. The filing 
equation was estimated using a linear probability model, while the reporting equation was 





5  Empirical results 
 
5.1 Descriptive analysis  
 
The study focuses on two aspects of compliance: the filing rate, that is, the share of subjects 
in a treatment group that files an income tax return in a specific period, and the reporting 
rate, that is, the average share of income reported across observations in a treatment (taxes 
paid/taxes owed).  
 
Full compliance occurs when participants file their tax return and report their actual income 
for each period. At the tax rate of 20 per cent, full compliance is represented by the thick blue 
line in Figure 3. However, none of the treatments achieve full compliance. On average, T1 
and T2 (partial information treatment) have the highest compliance level, and the least 
compliance is associated with T3. In fact, the control group where no information is revealed 
about peers has a higher compliance level than T3.  
 
Figure 3 Tax compliance rate among participants over ten rounds 
  
 
Specific to filing and reporting rates, none of the treatments achieve the optimal level of 100 
per cent compliance. Again, the filing rate (Figure 4) and the reporting rate (Figure 5) are 
higher in T1 and T2 than in the control group and T3. Despite the probability of detection for 
not filing being zero, a significant number of participants still file their tax return. This 
contradicts the prediction of the standard economic model of zero compliance when the 
deterrence mechanism is absent. That the compliance level is above zero serves as 
justification for the social influence theory and other theories around tax morale. One caveat 
to this argument is if participants believe their actions are being observed. However, the 
difference observed under different information interventions demonstrates that such caveat 
did not hold. The conclusion that can be drawn is that providing specific information (only 
regarding those penalised or those who have been compliant citizens) yields better results 
than providing blanket information.  
 
  




Figure 4 Filing rate among participants 
 
 
Figure 5 Reporting rate among participants 
 
5.2 Regression results 
 
The descriptive analysis is not robust as it fails to account for the possible effect of 
demographic factors and other confounding variables. We go further in using a multiple 
regression model to account for key demographic and behavioural variables among 
participants. Estimation results are presented in Table 3. In line with the descriptive results, 
the behaviour of a participant’s neighbours has a statistically significant and large effect in 
increasing both filing of tax returns and reporting of true income. Participants who were 
provided with information on the tax paid by the highest income earners in their group were 
21 per cent more likely to file their tax return and 23 per cent more likely to file their actual 
income relative to those who had been shown full information sets. Similarly, participants 
who were provided with information on the penalty paid by tax evaders in their group were 16 
per cent more likely to file their tax return and 23 per cent more likely to file their actual 
income relative to those who had been shown full information sets. Essentially, providing 





information and no information. Further comparison across treatments also shows that the 
compliance level was significantly higher under T1 and T2 than in the control group.   
 
T3 yielded sub-optimal outcomes, both in terms of the filing rate and the reporting rate. 
Under T3, the participants were exposed to full information which generated two 
counteracting effects. The exposure to information about those paying and the penalty for tax 
avoidance will incentivise a positive response to improve compliance like the instance of T1 
and T2. However, knowing that the majority could evade taxes yet not be punished 
discourages tax compliance. While these two effects are present, the results indicate a 
higher and dominant effect of the negative response.  
 
With the inclusion of control variables (age, gender, income, group size, total profit, and 
penalty paid), the effectiveness of the partial information over the full information treatment is 
mostly confirmed, except the reporting rate for T2, which is now insignificant. As such, 
participants who have been provided with information on the tax paid by the highest income 
earners in their group are 15 per cent more likely to file their tax return, and those who have 
been shown information on the penalty paid by tax evaders in their group are 11 per cent 
more likely to file their tax return.  
 
We found no significant difference between T1, T2 and the control group after accounting for 
the covariates. The effect of group size is not consistent across tax processing stages. While 
the filing rate is significantly higher among those in the larger group, we found the opposite 
but insignificant effect on the reporting rate. This implies group size, at least within the limited 
scope of the experiment, plays a weaker role in tax compliance. Put differently, the threshold 
for the peer effect to be dampened by group size is likely much larger than we accounted for 
in the experiment.  
 
Higher earnings per period increases the likelihood of filing tax returns and reporting the true 
income; higher profit (accumulated earnings) and paying a penalty in the past have a 
negative effect on tax compliance. Lower earnings could reduce the incentive to file or report 
truthfully as paying tax will further reduce the income. However, those that have accumulated 
wealth may have identified loopholes in the system that enable tax evasion such as the low 
probability of being audited if an individual does not file their tax returns. Similarly, the 
negative impact on tax compliance from having an audit experience can also be from having 
knowledge of tax evaders who were not penalised. Middle-aged adults (36 to 41) are also 
more likely to be tax compliant relative to young adults (18 to 24) which can be attributed to 
the fact that social norms and psychic costs are higher among older people. 
 
Regarding proposition 1, we found that the negative effect of information about peers’ tax 
behaviour dominates the positive effect. The effect of full information is not ambiguous, but 
sub-optimal compared to other information contents. The findings, however, support 
propositions 2 and 3 on the effect of partial information in improving tax compliance. 
Targeted information could serve as a useful non-pecuniary tool to enhance tax compliance. 





Table 3 Main regression results  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Filing rate Reporting rate Filing rate Reporting rate 
Treatment     
Control 0.129*** 0.146*** 0.125*** 0.0538* 
 (0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0331) (0.0303) 
Treatment 1 0.210*** 0.232*** 0.148*** 0.0278 
 (0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0325) (0.0302) 
Treatment 2 0.161*** 0.228*** 0.107*** 0.0717** 
 (0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0311) (0.0285) 
Large group   0.0967*** -0.0344 
   (0.0233) (0.0219) 
Income   0.000151* 0.000175** 
   (0.0000879) (0.0000795) 
Total profit   -0.0000596*** -0.0000575*** 
   (0.00000802) (0.00000730) 
Penalty paid   -0.353*** -0.406*** 
   (0.0292) (0.0265) 
Age group     
24–29 years   -0.0535** -0.00538 
   (0.0231) (0.0210) 
30–35 years    -0.0404 -0.0645** 
   (0.0325) (0.0295) 
36–41 years   0.166*** 0.132*** 
   (0.0540) (0.0489) 
42 years and above   -0.0416 -0.129 
   (0.0869) (0.0787) 
Male   0.0265 0.0372* 
   (0.0215) (0.0195) 
Filing rate    0.677*** 
    (0.0378) 
Constant 0.475*** 0.349*** 0.477*** 0.0298 
 (0.0269) (0.0270) (0.0874) (0.0812) 
Control vs T1 7.48*** 8.30*** 0.61 0.98 
Control vs T2 1.32 8.55*** 0.49 0.56 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; notes: The dependent variables are filing (=1 if yes, 0 if 
otherwise) and reporting rate (=taxes paid/taxes owed). 
 
5.3 Effect of tax knowledge and governance 
 
After each experimental session, participants completed a questionnaire that assessed their 
prior tax knowledge and their perception of governance in Nigeria. As argued by Besley and 
Persson (2014), high corruption may hinder the emergence of social norms of compliance. 
Lack of knowledge about tax rules can influence the taxpayers’ perceptions of the size of the 
tax burden and the unfairness of the tax system and this could result in low compliance 
(Mascagni and Santoro 2018). In addition, if previous experience with the tax system is that 
of unfairness, then tax knowledge could have a negative effect on compliance. We account 
for these factors in the regression result presented in Table 4.   
 
The findings show that those that have paid their tax before are 4 per cent less likely to file 
their tax return relative to those without prior experience. We also found a negative but 
insignificant effect of tax knowledge on reporting rate. Similarly, there is no significant 
difference in the tax behaviour between those that perceive government as either good or 
bad. However, those that are indifferent about the level of governance are less likely to file 
their tax and report their true income respectively, relative to those that believe that the level 
of governance is poor. Overall, we found tax knowledge and perception of governance as 





Table 4 Regression results accounting for governance and tax knowledge 
 (1) (2) 
 Filing rate Reporting rate 
Treatment   
Control  0.113*** 0.0493 
 (0.0336) (0.0310) 
Treatment 1 0.148*** 0.0243 
 (0.0325) (0.0304) 
Treatment 2 0.103*** 0.0657** 
 (0.0313) (0.0289) 
Large group  0.0955*** -0.0313 
 (0.0233) (0.0219) 
Income 0.000143 0.000175** 
 (0.0000876) (0.0000795) 
Total profit -0.0000573*** -0.0000553*** 
 (0.00000803) (0.00000733) 
Penalty paid -0.352*** -0.404*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0267) 
Age group   
24–29 years -0.0427* -0.00146 
 (0.0233) (0.0212) 
30–35 years  -0.0180 -0.0544* 
 (0.0332) (0.0302) 
36–41 years 0.202*** 0.148*** 
 (0.0544) (0.0495) 
42 years and above -0.0568 -0.147* 
 (0.0869) (0.0789) 
Male 0.0415* 0.0437** 
 (0.0218) (0.0198) 
Have you paid tax before (reference 
group: no) 
  
Yes  -0.0411** -0.0253 
 (0.0209) (0.0191) 
Perception of governance 
(reference group: poor) 
  
Indifferent -0.0899*** -0.0779*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0274) 
Good 0.0325 -0.00786 
 (0.0215) (0.0195) 
Filing rate  0.676*** 
  (0.0380) 
Constant  0.492*** 0.0538 
 (0.0882) (0.0822) 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; notes: the dependent variables are form filed (=1 if yes, 0 if 
otherwise) and reporting rate (=taxes paid/taxes owed). 
 
 
6  Policy implications 
 
This paper examines the role of exposing information about peers’ tax behaviour on tax 
compliance in Nigeria. Based on an artefactual field experiment among own account 
workers, we find that an information intervention can play an important role in tax 
compliance. Specifically, targeting information around descriptive norms, what people can 
directly observe, can be a way to improve tax compliance. Providing information on 
punishment or good practice, that appeals to feelings of morality, yields higher tax 
compliance. The findings of the study, that the presence of social norms influences individual 
behaviour, is consistent with a range of psychological phenomena including bandwagon 
effects, inclusion in social networks and building social capital, as well as the fear of 
alienation (Monteiro 2018). Essentially, individuals do not only take into account the financial 
implications of their decisions but also base their decisions on the social context where 
decisions are made. However, the results also point to the need to be strategic in the use of 
information and social influence as this can draw both negative and positive responses. This 
result underscores exploring only information contexts and types (like T1 and T2 in this 




Tax enforcement agencies could leverage on positive social influences to develop a social 
norm of compliance among citizens. However, the more important question is how this social 
norm emerges. Tax education and perceptions about the level of effectiveness of 
government are two crucial factors moulding social norms over time. Yet, the study finds that 
tax knowledge and perception of governance play a minimal or negative role for tax 
compliance. This points to an important area that policymakers can use to galvanise 
compliance. The perceived fairness of the tax system and the ability of taxpayers to relate to 
the effectiveness of use of tax revenue can develop a culture of compliance and, through 
social interaction, influence others to also pay. In essence, tax compliance is driven by 
multiple factors, including economic and non-pecuniary factors. The policy agenda should 







  Overall sample Control Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
Tax level 88.92 (84.66) 83.53 (84.18) 99.160 (83.540) 97.55 (84.54) 59.51 (80.41) 
Tax to declared 
income ratio 
0.10 (0.09) 0.09 (0.09) 0.11 (0.09) 0.11 (0.09) 0.06 (0.09) 
Reported income 0.52 (0.48) 0.49 (0.49) 0.58 (0.47) 0.57 (0.48) 0.34 (0.46) 
Final income 745.57 (134.96) 751.96 (132.12) 733.35 (133.35) 739.52 (136.22) 770.77 (135.90) 
Filing rate 0.61 (0.26) 0.60 (0.32) 0.68 (0.26) 0.63 (0.18) 0.47 (0.24) 
Under-reporting rate 0.48 (0.49) 0.46 (0.49) 0.53 (0.49) 0.55 (0.49) 0.29 (0.45) 
Penalty 45.21 (115.58) 52.2 (124.29) 39.30 (107.70) 37.68 (107.21) 62.12 (130.64) 
Observation 2,120 500 550 750 320 




Instructions for the control group5 
Welcome to the experiment. Please remain silent and seated until the end of the experiment. 
If you have questions at any stage of the experiment, you can only do so by raising your 
hand and the laboratory assistant will attend to you accordingly. You will now participate in a 
decision-making experiment that will last several decision ‘rounds’.  
 
What material do you have for the experiment? You have been given three tools to make 
use of during the experiment. First is the computer monitor where you input all your decisions 
in each round. The second tool is the instruction manual and you are free to read this at any 
time during the course of the experiment. We have also provided you with a plain sheet to 
record the income you earned in each round as this information might be required in the 




● In each round, you first complete an earnings task and then make a tax reporting 
decision. 
● Each round is completely independent from the others, which means your decisions in 
one round in no way affect the outcome of any other round. 
● Each of you is a member of a five-person group. The computer managing the experiment 
completely did the matching of the group, therefore there is no way you can determine 
the members of your group.   
 
How will you earn income in each round? 
 
The computer program will select a number between zero and ten. You are then asked to 
make a guess to predict the number the computer has picked. The closer your prediction is 
to the number selected by the computer the higher your income. For example, if you pick the 
same number as the computer, you get 1,000 points; however, the farthest prediction from 
the number selected by the computer earns just 500 points.  
 
At the end of the experiment, you will exchange:  
 
5 The instruction sets for other treatments are available upon request.  
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1,000 points = N350 
 
How does the tax process work?  
 
This stage involves making a decision about filing and reporting of your income for tax 
purposes.  
 
● First, you are to choose whether or not to file your tax.  
 
If you file your tax… 
 
● You decide how much income to report bearing in mind that you can choose any amount 
between zero and the income earned for the round. (Note: income earned is known to 
only you). 
● After reporting your earnings, you are taxed 20 per cent of your declared income. Your 
income after tax will be the difference between your earned income and tax paid. 
● However, you have a chance of being audited. The chance of an audit is 20 per cent, 
meaning one out of five people will be audited. Audits are determined completely at 
random and do not depend on your decisions or the decisions of others.  
● If you are audited and your declared income is below your actual income, you will be 
required to pay a penalty equal to 40 per cent of your income for the round.  
 
If you do not file a tax form… 
 






Appendix 3 z-Tree interface for the experiment 
Earning stage: here the participant makes a guess of a number between 0 and 10. 
 
This page displays earnings based on the number guessed.  
 





Those filing proceed to the reporting stage. This page displays the experimental parameters: 
the probability of being audited if you choose to file your income.
Based on the reported income, this page displays total tax paid for that period.
  






Information stage: for the control group, no information about other participants is shown.
  





Information stage: for treatment 2, the information page displays the person audited in the 
group and the amount of penalty paid. 
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